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Abstract: Mather’s (2019) provocative claim that octopuses have a mind hinges on the inference
that their striking behavioural flexibility is evidence of “complex” cognitive abilities. I discuss
alternative explanations — not to deny the possibility of complexity but to point out that current
evidence does not allow us to draw firm conclusions. Only an agnostic approach will lead to the
systematic investigation of octopus behaviour and ultimately, greater insights into the cognitive
capacities of these fascinating creatures.
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Mather (2019) provides a valuable synopsis of octopus perception, motor control and
behavioural flexibility to support the conclusion that the octopus has a mind. One of the key
pillars of Mather’s reasoning is that the striking behavioural flexibility observed in octopuses is
evidence of complex cognition, which in turn requires a mind. As pointed out by other
commentators, Mather’s claim that octopuses have a mind is problematic because the author
does not provide a clear definition of ‘mind’ (Mallatt, 2019). As it currently stands, the term
‘mind’ is too vague to validate or disprove through scientific testing (Schnell and Vallortigara,
2019).
I will focus on an equally problematic point in Mather’s approach (cf. Gutfreund, 2019):
the author’s interpretation of what we currently know about octopus behaviour as clear-cut
evidence of complex cognition. In Mather’s words: ‘… octopuses can perform the operations
suggested by Emery and Clayton (2004) as indicative of cognitive ability in mammals and birds
— flexibility, causal reasoning, prospection, and imagination’. In Figure 7, Mather provides
interesting examples of octopus behaviour that supposedly demonstrate these cognitive
abilities (see also Mather and Dickel, 2017). For example, the carrying of coconut shells by
veined octopuses (Finn et al., 2009) is classified as an example of prospection – the ability to
plan for the future. Mather also suggests that the Passing Cloud display (Packard and Sanders,
1971) and the avoidance of stinging anemones (Ross, 1971) provide evidence of causal
reasoning – the ability to identify the functional relationship between a cause and its effect.
These interpretations should be considered speculative because we have limited
evidence to date that alternative explanations for these behaviours can be dismissed. Moreover,
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the evidence of cognitive abilities such as future planning and causal reasoning is itself still being
debated in cognitively advanced and more established model animals such as apes and corvids
(Penn and Povinelli, 2007; Redshaw et al., 2017; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007). Veined
octopuses might carry coconut shells today because they can envisage that these tools can
provide a benefit in the future (that they can be arranged into a den in case of a predatory
attack). But this hypothesis has never been tested; so any inference about the cognitive
underpinnings of this fascinating behaviour requires caution. We cannot exclude the possibility
that other, simpler, mechanisms may trigger this behaviour. For example, octopuses may — in
the absence of any prospective ability — carry around coconut shells only because these objects
have previously become associated with a positive outcome, such as a thwarted attack by a
predator or reduced stress from being covered by a protective casing (Amodio et al., 2019).
Similar arguments can be raised about the other putative examples of causal reasoning
in cephalopods. Passing Cloud is a skin display characterized by a well-defined dark area that
seems to ‘move’ directionally on the animal’s body (Packard and Sanders, 1971). Cephalopods
most often exhibit this to startle prey, as well as conspecifics or other animals. While it is
theoretically possible that the Passing Cloud could involve causal reasoning, this interpretation
is premature without careful empirical testing. We cannot yet rule out that Passing Cloud has a
strong genetic component and/or simple learning mechanisms. Similarly, octopuses may
develop avoidance of stinging anemones as a result of associative learning when physical
interactions with the anemone have previously become associated with a negative outcome
(see also Godfrey-Smith, 2019). Ross (1971) reported that octopuses: (i) behave as if they have
received a ‘punishment stimulus’ after touching an anemone, and (ii) progressively inhibit their
predatory response, selectively, toward hermit crabs that have had a stinging anemone
attached to their shells.
In comparative psychology, careful testing of alternative explanations, paired with the
constraint of parsimony, often favours more ‘basic’ mechanisms, such as associative learning,
over ‘higher-order’ cognitive processes. This approach can foster a dichotomous view of
cognition, with the risk of dismissing crucial nuances (cf. Amodio et al., 2018; Penn and Povinelli,
2007). Our understanding of non-human animals can be increased by exploring how these
putatively independent systems work together (Cheke et al., 2011). There is no guarantee that
favouring simpler cognitive explanations brings us closer to the truth. However, inferring
sophisticated cognitive abilities without appropriate controls for simpler explanations can be
even more problematic: It can fuel misleading beliefs, particularly in non-scientists, who lack the
specialized background knowledge and tools to evaluate such claims critically.
Cephalopods are fascinating creatures. With their large brains, learning skills, and flexible
behavioural repertoires, these molluscs are promising models for the study of complex
cognition (Amodio et al., 2019; Amodio and Fiorito, 2013). But our current understanding of
cephalopod cognition is still too limited to allow us to draw firm conclusions about the cognitive
mechanisms underlying their behaviour. Future research may eventually support Mather’s view
that octopuses are capable of future planning and causal reasoning. For the time being, though,
it may be wiser to adopt an optimistic agnosticism (sensu stricto Lurz et al., 2014), suspending
acceptance until compelling evidence is collected.
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